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 ABSTRACT 
Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power 
by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues 
We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or 
sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are 
determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence 
of buyer cooperatives among small and medium sized firms. 
 
Keywords:  Nash bargaining solution, alternating-offer bargaining, bargaining power, 
buyer power, cooperatives, input markets. 
JEL Classification:  C78, L41, L96 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verhandlungsmacht durch Käuferkooperationen 
Dieses Papier entwickelt eine neue Erklärung dafür, warum Zusammen-
schlüsse zwischen Käufern (oder Verkäufern), die in unterschiedlichen Märkten 
aktiv sind, deren Verhandlungsmacht stärken können. Unser Ansatz kann unter 
anderem erklären, warum sich kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen oft zu 
Einkaufsgenossenschaften zusammenschließen. 
iii 
11. Introduction
A large body of industrial organization literature investigates the extent to which coordinated 
activities through mergers or alliances lead to market power. It has also been noted that mergers 
may lead to considerable “buyer power” in oligopolistic input markets. This paper contributes to 
this literature by providing a novel explanation as to why large firms may have greater bargaining 
power in oligopolistic input markets than small firms. Our findings can also explain the preva-
lence of buyers’ cooperatives, through which small and medium sized firms conduct their supply 
negotiations.
Formally, we consider two independent markets. In each market, an input supplier negotiates 
with a downstream producer. If an agreement is reached in a market, a fixed benefit of coopera-
tion is divided between the negotiating parties. Within this setup, we investigate the effect of 
forming an alliance between the buyers of the two markets using a variant of the standard two-
person alternating-offer bargaining model. In our model, forming an alliance between the buyers 
amounts to delegating negotiations to one of its identical members with the common understand-
ing that the spoils from bargaining are split equally among all members of the alliance.
We will show that forming a buyers’ alliance among risk-averse buyers can be advantageous 
in our model. There are two intuitive explanations for this. First, when an integrated party negoti-
ates with each of the other parties, it takes the outcome of the bargaining with the other party as 
given. This increases the integrated party’s fall-back position as it is risking only part of its busi-
ness opportunity in each negotiation. To the extent that this makes the integrated party bolder in 
bargaining, it increases the share it can capture. We call this the fall-back wealth effect of being 
2involved in multiple negotiations. Second, when bargaining jointly, the two members of an alli-
ance share the risk of a breakdown. When buyers prefer to risk half the amount twice rather than 
the full amount once, the split of the breakdown risk between the alliance members makes them 
bolder and thereby increases the alliance’s share. We call this the risk-sharing effect of negotiating 
jointly.
We illustrate through some examples (Examples 1 and 2) that risk aversion per se does not 
imply the presence of either the fall-back wealth effect or the risk-sharing effect. However, we 
show that under certain conditions, namely that preferences can be represented by a HARA utility 
function (Example 3), risk aversion implies the presence of these two effects and that forming a 
coalition is profitable for risk averse buyers. Since risk aversion plays a key role in our results, we 
will devote the next section ( Section 2) to the issue of the plausibility of this assumption on 
firms’ attitudes toward risk.
 Alliances of buyers (or sellers) across markets are found in many industries. For example, 
buyers’ cooperatives through which farmers pool their resources to buy inputs such as seeds, fer-
tilizers, petroleum products, farming equipment, heating oil, and hardware are common in the US 
agricultural industry. Similarly, farmers often form marketing cooperatives to sell farm products 
to wholesalers and retailers. According to the National Cooperative Business Association 
(www.ncba.coop), there are approximately 4100 agricultural cooperatives with 3.9 million mem-
berships. The net business volume of agricultural cooperatives amounted to $105.5 billion in 
1994. 
3In the US cable television market, the business press asserts that MSOs (multiple system 
operators) that consist of local companies operating in different cities fare better in input market 
negotiations with broadcasters than smaller local cable operating companies.1 The Cable Act of 
1992 ordered the Federal Communications Commission to establish legal restrictions on the 
national size of MSOs. This legislation took place despite the fact that local cable companies typ-
ically had a near 100% market share in the output market. One interpretation of this legislation is 
that Congress was concerned about excessive bargaining power of MSOs in input markets. 
Similarly, it has been argued that bargaining power increases with the national size of a 
movie theater chain. For instance, after monopolizing the Las Vegas movie theater market, Syufy 
Enterprises was sued by the Department of Justice for the alleged impact of the merger in the 
input (rather than the product) market. Testimony by one of Syufy’s suppliers revealed that, in his 
mind, Syufy’s bargaining power was severely limited by the fact that Syufy had only 1.3% 
national market share.2 
Gal-Or (1999a, 1999b) gives an account of the recent increase in the US health care industry 
concentration. She argues that an input bargaining model is appropriate for analyzing the health 
care industry.3 Her theoretical models provide an interesting perspective for the reason why we 
1. Gal-Or and Dukes (2002) investigate media mergers focusing on the effect of informative advertising. In 
their model, media merger affect the amount of advertising shown, which affects consumers’ knowledge 
about available products, which in turn affects the intensity of competition for consumer goods and 
thereby the consumer-good firms’ willingness to pay for advertising. Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) use a sim-
ilar model to investigate under what conditions both media companies and advertisers would like to 
engage in exclusive dealing, which reduces the amount of advertising and product market competition in 
equilibrium and thereby increases the available rents to the firms.
2. See Waterman (1996) for a detailed discussion.
3. Gal-Or (1999b) also discusses why vertical mergers between hospitals and physician practices can 
increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis health insurance providers.
4observe alliances between health insurance providers, between hospitals, and between physicians. 
Our paper is complementary to her papers in that we provide a new reason why such mergers can 
give rise to bargaining power.
Buyer cooperatives are common in other countries as well. In Germany, for example, the first 
modern farmers’ cooperative was founded by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in 1864. By the turn 
of the century, farmers’ cooperatives (Genossenschaft) became widespread. While initially many 
cooperatives focused on financing, nowadays cooperatives are commonly used to buy inputs or to 
sell farm products (Raiffeisenwarengenossenschaften). Similarly, in many other traditional trades, 
small business owners conduct input negotiations jointly through cooperatives (Einkaufsgenos-
senschaften). For example, Edeka - a cooperative of about 5000 small retailers (and some larger 
retailers) - coordinates supply (and marketing) activities for its members. 
Our model is related to the literature on input-market power. There have been various expla-
nations as to why a larger downstream firm should get a better deal. One explanation is that a 
monopsonist who faces competitive input suppliers can reduce its input demand and thereby 
lower the input price. Empirically, this suggests that a concentrated downstream market structure 
should lead to a lower quantity traded. In most input markets, however, a few sellers face a few 
buyers and market power exists for both buyers and suppliers.4 It is therefore natural to think of 
input market bargaining as determining the terms of trade.
4. See Waterson (1980), Salinger (1988), and Kuehn and Vives (1999) for two stage models of imperfectly 
competitive input markets in which the upstream firms compete as Stackelberg leaders in wholesale 
prices and the downstream firms compete with each other in the final goods market taking the input 
prices as given. 
5Under the assumption that input-market negotiations are efficient, Horn and Wolinsky 
(1988b) analyze mergers that increase bargaining power in oligopolistic input markets. They 
show that it can be profitable to form an alliance between suppliers (a workers’ union) since, in 
equilibrium, each supplier negotiates on the margin taking it as given that the other negotiation is 
resolved. The bargaining parties thus split the incremental surplus of each input-market relation. 
If the suppliers are substitutes, twice the incremental surplus is less than the full surplus and a 
merger is profitable because the (incremental) surplus is always split equally between risk-neutral 
negotiating parties.5 This idea has been generalized by Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and 
Wey (2003), who show in different cooperative models that a downstream merger is profitable if 
suppliers have a decreasing surplus function (or increasing net unit cost) because this implies that 
twice the incremental surplus is less than the entire surplus.6 In our model, we abstract from these 
incremental surplus effects, rooted in the production technology and generated by production-
related interactions between negotiations. Our bargaining effects rely solely on buyers’ prefer-
ences relevant for bargaining. 
If input-market bargaining is restricted to prices, the quantity traded is related to the agreed-
upon input price. This yields an additional bargaining affect, for the bargaining frontier is not lin-
ear in this case even if agents are risk-neutral. Indeed, Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) showed that in 
5. See also Jun (1989).
6. Chipty and Snyder (1999) assume that each negotiation is settled according to the Nash bargaining solu-
tion taking it as given that all other negotiations are resolved. Inderst and Wey (2003) use the Shapley 
value to calculate the benefits of a merger and justify this by showing also that the Shapley value can be 
obtained as an equilibrium of a noncooperative bargaining model with contingent offers. These papers 
assume independent downstream markets. Shaffer (2001) allows for competition between downstream 
firms. The written contract between the manufacturer and the retailer can specify any nonlinear pricing 
scheme. Within this model, industry profits are maximized only if there is a retail monopoly. Heidhues 
(2000) argues that efficient (rather than a nonlinear pricing) input-market negotiations with a single sup-
plier preclude downstream competition between its buyers.
6this case a merger to monopoly between firms that compete in strategic substitutes is not profit-
able as it has an adverse effect on input-market negotiations. To avoid this, in his view absurd, 
result, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) imposes an additional assumption on the “generalized Nash 
solution” he uses to determine input prices. In effect, this assumption implies that he uses a pro-
portional bargaining solution, i.e., a bargaining solution according to which the benefits are split 
Pareto-efficiently according to a fixed sharing rule . As downstream monopolization increases 
the pie, it makes both parties better off. Horn and Wolinsky’s result has been also qualified by 
Dobson and Waterson (1997), who assume that downstream firms compete in prices (i.e., strate-
gic complements) rather than quantities. In their model, a downstream merger has two positive 
effects: First, due to the decrease in competition, the benefit that can be split between the down-
stream firm and the supplier increases. Second, the supplier has fewer alternative outlets avail-
able, which increases the incremental benefit of reaching an agreement with a given downstream 
firm. This reduces the supplier’s bargaining power and makes downstream firms better off. The 
merging firms, however, lose market share to their competitors. They, however, do not provide 
conditions under which a merger is profitable.
Our paper differs from the above papers in that we assume away any interrelation between 
merging parties based on market demand or technology. Thus we identify pure bargaining effects 
of merging two independent parties. Our bargaining effect does not appear in any of the previous 
models because they all assume that bargaining parties are risk neutral. Relaxing this assumption, 
our paper provides conditions under which a merger enhances the bargaining power of the merg-
ing parties. 
α
7One interesting issue is what welfare consequences the increased bargaining power of an alli-
ance has. Indeed, there has been a growing concern on the consequences of buyer power among 
antitrust authorities in the US and Europe.7 In the main model of this paper (in  Section 3), input-
market bargaining is efficient and thus buyer power has only distributive consequences. We pro-
vide, however, a simple example (Example 4 in  Section 4) that shows that there can be welfare 
consequences of the increased buyer power due to alliance. In this example, we add an initial 
(long term) investment decision with contractual incompleteness. Thus the investing firms face a 
hold-up problem as the investment benefits will partially be shared through bargaining with their 
negotiating partners. In such an environment, alliance has an effect on investment incentives and 
industry development. 
Viewed as a contribution to bargaining theory, this paper investigates a noncooperative bar-
gaining model in which an alliance (that is, its representative) negotiates sequentially with two 
bargaining partners. Each negotiation is modeled as an alternating-offer bargaining with an exog-
enously given breakdown probability. There is a fixed (monetary) benefit from cooperation that 
can be divided in each of the two negotiations independent of whether the other negotiation is 
resolved. The ability of an alliance to share its payoff leads to the risk-sharing effect. The effect of 
what an alliance receives in one negotiation on the other negotiation leads to the fall-back wealth 
effect. 
In a sequential setting, it is not difficult to see that the outcome of the first negotiation can 
positively affect the amount the integrated party receives in the second negotiation. (Proposition 
7.  In the US, buyer power explicitly enters the merger control guidelines as an efficiency defense (see the 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, with revision on Section 4 on efficiencies in 1997). Similarly, the 
buyer power defense enters the 1998 Competition Act of the UK. 
81). There is, however, a feedback effect of the second negotiation on the first negotiation, for the 
result of the second negotiation is anticipated in the first negotiation. Suppose that as the alliance 
gets more in the first negotiation, it gets more in the second negotiation. Then the alliance is effec-
tively facing a negative tax or subsidy on what it receives in the first negotiation. This subsidy 
increases the amount of pie to be divided in the first negotiation. Thus the alliance’s opponent in 
the first bargaining will demand more. The overall implication of this feedback is not entirely 
clear. For instance, Chae (2002) shows that under certain conditions, the subsidy can hurt the sub-
sidized party in bargaining. We show, however, that in the presence of the risk sharing effect and 
the fall-back wealth effect, the members of an alliance receive more after integration than before 
(Proposition 2). 
From the modeling point of view, we can demonstrate our qualitative conclusion regarding 
the advantage of forming an alliance in an alternative model where two negotiations are carried 
out simultaneously rather than sequentially. In a simultaneous bargaining model, each bargaining 
problem is resolved according to the Nash bargaining solution taking as given the solution to all 
other bargaining problems. We used this simultaneous bargaining approach in a previous version 
of this paper.8 One advantage of the sequential approach of the current model is that it is a nonco-
operative bargaining model with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which facilitates the com-
parison between bargaining outcomes for integrated and independent bargainers. In contrast, no 
such noncooperative foundation is available for the simultaneous bargaining solutions used in the 
literature.
8. Chae and Heidhues (1999a).
9In  Section 2, we explain why it is natural to assume in our bargaining model that firms’ 
objective functions are concave in profits. In Section 3, we characterize conditions under which 
forming an alliance among buyers (or sellers) increases their bargaining power. In Section 4, we 
provide an example where the increased buyer power through alliance can have welfare conse-
quences. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. Some technical proofs are relegated to the 
Appendix.
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2. Firms’ Objective Functions
It is often assumed that firms are risk neutral, that is, their objective functions are linear in 
profits. However, the impact of risk aversion on industry outcomes has also been studied in many 
standard models of competition. Sandmo (1971) studies the theory of competitive firms under risk 
aversion. Appelbaum and Katz (1986) investigate the impact of risk aversion on comparative stat-
ics in competitive industries. Asplund (2002) determines equilibrium outcomes in standard oli-
gopoly models with risk averse firms. Spagnolo (1999) points out that if firms are risk averse, 
multi-market contact facilitates collusion, and Spagnolo (2002) argues that the concavity of the 
objective function helps to sustain collusive agreements.9
The assumption that firms are risk neutral in decision making is typically justified on the 
grounds that financial markets are perfect and owners’ portfolios are well diversified. In reality, 
however, owners’ portfolios are not always well diversified. For instance, think of small busi-
nesses managed by their owners. The owners of such small firms often invest a large share of their 
wealth in their own firms and hence their financial wealth is largely determined by the success of 
their firms. This implies that business decisions will be influenced by the owners’ risk-aversion. 
Within a von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, it is thus natural to assume that these owner-
managed firms behave as if they had concave objective functions. Moreover, it is hard to imagine 
that a firm can insure itself against not coming to an agreement in negotiations with one of its sup-
pliers. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the negotiation risk falls on the owner of a small 
9. Discussions in this section benefited from the discussions in Spagnolo (1999) but expand them. 
11
businesses. In fact, many of the examples we considered in the previous section involve buy-
ers’alliances between small businesses. 
While the assumption of risk aversion can be taken literally in the case of buyers’alliances 
between small businesses, there is also overwhelming evidence that large firms behave as if they 
were risk averse. For example, there is a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that top 
managers manipulate accounts and tune production decisions in order to decrease the variability 
of profits over time.10 This income smoothing is indicative of the fact that firms have strictly con-
cave objective functions. Also, firms invest considerable resources in order to hedge through var-
ious kinds of derivatives. Since firms with linear objective functions have no reason to hedge, this 
is further evidence that real-world firms behave as if they were risk averse. This strong evidence 
is reflected by a large theoretical literature that explains why firms might behave as if they were 
risk averse.
One reason given in the theoretical literature as to why firms have strictly concave objective 
functions is the tax code.11 Items such as tax credits generate convexity in firms’ tax liabilities 
since the present value of unused credits diminishes during carry forward to future periods. This 
convexity in tax liabilities gives rise to firms’ concave objective functions. Indeed, the nonlinear-
ity of the tax code is one of the standard arguments explaining why hedging is desirable.
Another reason for why firms may pursue concave objective functions lies in financial mar-
ket imperfections. Past works suggest that due to information asymmetries in capital markets, a 
10. See, for example, Degeorge et al (1999), Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Kasanen et al (1996), and 
Ronen and Sadan (1981).
11. For early papers in finance, see Smith and Schulz (1985) and Myers and Majluf (1984).
12
firm’s cost of external finance is strictly convex.12 This implies that firms prefer smooth earnings 
paths to ensure that internal funds are always available and suboptimal investment policies can be 
avoided.13 Indeed, the convex cost of external finance is a common explanation as to why firms 
should and do hedge.14 Furthermore, it has been argued that investors value assets with smooth 
returns higher. Some institutional investors face regulations that induce them to prefer assets with 
stable returns.15 Small investors, on the other hand, face transaction costs when selling or buying 
assets and hence may prefer smooth returns for consumption reasons. Equity holders potentially 
gain from reduced variance in earnings through improvement in portfolio optimization decisions. 
So far we have argued that owners or investors have reasons for wanting their firms to follow 
concave objective functions, i.e., to behave as if the firms were risk averse. There is also a large 
body of literature explaining why managers want to maximize a concave objective function even 
if the owners would have linear objective functions. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) develop an opti-
mal contract model in which owners cannot commit to long-term contracts. In their model, 
incumbent managers earn rents and new performance measures are better signals than old ones. In 
equilibrium, shareholders may find it optimal to replace a manager in low profit periods even if 
these low profit periods follow high profit periods. Since managers earn rents while being 
employed, they are willing to incur positive costs in order to smooth reported profits and divi-
12. See, for example, Hubbard et al (1993).
13. See Froot et al (1993).
14.Note also that the literature on the “credit channel of monetary policy” is based on the idea of an external 
finance premium, i.e., the idea that external financing (issuing equity or debt) is more costly than internal 
financing (retained earnings). For a survey of this literature, see Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
15. For an empirical analysis of this question in a debt dominated country, see Kasanen et al (1996).
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dends and thereby reduce the chance of being fired. The managerial incentives thus induce the 
managers to behave as if they had strictly concave objective functions.16
Another standard explanation for income smoothing and hedging is that managers are finan-
cially constrained and risk averse.17 Indeed, in the large body of literature that views the relation-
ship between shareholders and managers as a principle-agent problem, the well-known trade-off 
between incentives and risk sharing follows from the assumption that managers are more risk 
averse than owners.
Joskow and Rose (1994) report evidence that corporate boards tend to cap managers’ 
bonuses, thereby supporting an earlier observation made by Healy (1985).18 This gives managers 
an incentive to transfer wealth from periods in which they are above the cap to periods to which 
they are below the cap, i.e., to engage in income smoothing, providing another reason for why 
firms behave as if they had concave objective functions.
Following the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is often assumed that manag-
ers want to invest into pet projects or follow other pursuits such as the firms’ growth and power. 
This implies that managers may invest even if the pecuniary return from investing is negative. For 
these type of investments, the managers are financially constrained. Thus managers prefer to have 
some free cashflow every period and this makes them averse to variations in firms’ profits.
16. See also DeFond and Park (1997), who provide some empirical support for this argument.
17. See Stulz (1984).
18. See also Holthausen et al (1995).
14
Debt financing gives rise to the risk of bankruptcy. Managers are strongly averse to the risk 
of bankruptcy because it ruins their future earnings opportunity. Bondholders also have an incen-
tive to reduce the variability of earnings to minimize the probability of financial distress and its 
associated bankruptcy costs.19 In the presence of stochastic shocks, this keeps managers from 
maximizing expected profits and leads them to avoid bankruptcy.20 Managers thus behave as if 
they had strictly concave objective functions.21
19. For more details, see Smith and Stulz (1985).
20. A complementary argument is that if bondholders can observe neither the firm’s ability to smooth 
income nor the underlying variance of the firm’s earnings, then managers have an incentive to smooth 
reported income in order to lower claim holders’ perception of the variance of the underlying earnings 
and thus the risk of bankruptcy. The reason is that this decreases the firm’s cost of borrowing. See True-
man and Titman (1988).
21. The above arguments lead Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) to state that “because of financial market 
imperfections... firms act in a risk averse manner.”
15
3. Buyer Power through Alliance
There are two parallel markets. In each market, a seller and a buyer bargain over the price of 
a good.22 The value of the good to a buyer is , while it has zero value to a seller if unsold. The 
two sellers have identical preferences and the two buyers have identical preferences. The buyers 
in markets 1 and 2 are called buyer 1 and buyer 2, respectively, and the sellers in markets 1 and 2 
are called seller 1 and seller 2, respectively. 
Suppose the two buyers form an alliance. The alliance delegates bargaining to one player. 
Since the two buyers have identical preferences, it does not matter to whom bargaining is dele-
gated. The buyer to whom bargaining is delegated will be simply called “the buyer”. When bar-
gaining with the sellers is completed, the two buyers split the spoils. 
The buyer first bargains with seller 1 in a Rubinstein-type (1982) alternating-offer protocol. 
After each rejection, there exists a fixed probability of breakdown. If the bargaining ends with an 
acceptance or if the bargaining breaks down, the buyer immediately starts bargaining with seller 2 
in the same alternating-offer protocol, possibly with a different breakdown probability. 
Denote the von-Neumann Morgenstern (vN-M) utility function of an individual by  
( ). We assume that  is smooth, , , and 
 for any . (1)
22. This paper was originally motivated by bargaining between a cable operator and a broadcaster in a televi-
sion market. See Chae (1998) for a policy analysis in this market using a bargaining model.
π
ui
i b s,= ui ui 0( ) 0= ui′ 0>
d dx⁄( )2 ui x( ) ui d( )–( )log 0< x d 0≥>
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The last condition implies that the log of utility gain is strictly concave. It is satisfied if players are 
weakly risk averse or risk neutral, i.e., . But it is also satisfied by some risk-loving prefer-
ences. For instance, it is always satisfied if players’ preferences can be represented by vN-M util-
ity functions with constant relative risk aversion, , where .23
Given a payoff , a breakdown payoff , and breakdown probability , define an indi-
vidual’s certainty equivalent  as the payoff  such that . 
The amount an individual is willing to pay in order to avoid an infinitesimal chance of breakdown 
will be called the marginal risk concession. It is formally defined and denoted as
.
Observe that (1) is equivalent to 
 for any .
We can analyze the model backward starting from the bargaining between the buyer and 
seller 2. This part of the model is similar to a standard two-person Rubinstein bargaining game. 
Let  denote what the buyer (that is, the alliance) received from bargaining with seller 1. Also, 
let  denote what the buyer receives from bargaining with seller 2. Both  and  are split 
equally between buyer 1 and buyer 2. Given , the feasible utility set and the disagreement point 
are, respectively,
23.  See Chae and Heidhues (1999a).
ui″ 0≤
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,
.
Since this game is a standard two-person bargaining game, it is well known that there exists a 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In the equilibrium, bargaining ends immediately and in each 
subgame a proposing player’s offer ensures that the receiver is indifferent between accepting the 
offer and facing the risk of a breakdown in order to become a proposer himself. The equilibrium 
payoff vector  can be obtained as follows: Let  be the equilibrium payoff vec-
tor when the buyer is the initial proposer, and let  the equilibrium payoff vector when the 
seller is the initial proposer. If the breakdown probability is , then
,
.
That is, 
, (2)
. (3)
The solution can be obtained by combining these with the feasibility conditions
, (4)
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. (5)
For convenience, let us assume that the buyer is the initial proposer in bargaining with a 
seller, and let . We will now determine  in the bargaining between the buyer 
and seller 1. For this problem, the feasible utility set and the disagreement point are, respectively,
,
.
Put  and assume that the function  satisfies the strict log-
concavity condition (1), which was assumed of . Then there exists a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium for the bargaining game between the buyer and seller 1. The assumption that  satis-
fies (1) is equivalent to 
. (6)
Since  is an increasing function of  and  for any 
, a sufficient condition for (6) is 
 for any . 
For instance, if the buyer’s preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, then, as will be 
seen in Example 2 below,  for any  and thus (6) is satisfied. 
zb ys+ π=
x2 φp x1( ) yb≡= x1
S1 ub
x1
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p x1( )
2
---------------+   us π x1–( ),   : 0 x1 π≤ ≤  
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=
d1 φ
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0>
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From now on, we will study the limit solution as the breakdown probabilities go to zero.24 
Let . Then, as will be shown in the Appendix,  is the solution 
to 
. (7)
Similarly, as will be also shown in the Appendix, given the function , one can obtain 
the buyer’s equilibrium payoff in his bargaining with seller 1 as 
. (8)
Denote the solution to the above equation as , and let . 
Now we will compare a buyer’s payoff obtained above to his payoff when the two buyers do 
not form an alliance. Without alliance, a buyer and a seller bargain in each market according to 
the standard alternating-offer procedure with a fixed probability of breakdown after each rejec-
tion. As is well known, as the breakdown probability goes to zero, the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome  approaches the Nash (1950) bargaining solution that maximizes 
. Denote a buyer’s equilibrium payoff at the Nash bargaining solution by . 
Then it satisfies 
. (9)
24. The breakdown probability of the bargaining between the buyer and seller 2 can be in principle different 
from the breakdown probability for the bargaining between the buyer and seller 1. 
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Observe that in the special case in which all players are risk-neutral,  and hence a 
buyer receives . 
We will now show that under the two conditions below, forming an alliance benefits the buy-
ers, i.e., .
Strong Fall-back Wealth Effect (SF):  for , .
Weak Risk-sharing (WR): .
Alternatively, one may require the following two conditions, weakening SF and strengthen-
ing WR. 
Weak Fall-back Wealth Effect (WF):  for , .
Strong Risk-sharing (SR): .
SF says that the marginal risk concession of a player is decreasing in one’s fall-back position. 
WF relaxes SF to a weak inequality. WR requires that, for a zero breakdown point, doubling the 
amount of stake at least doubles the marginal risk concession of a player. In other words, WR says 
that when the breakdown point is equal to zero, the marginal risk concession is convex in x. 
 Example 1.  Suppose that an individual is risk averse and the individual’s preferences can be 
represented by vN-M utility functions with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), i.e., 
 where . Then 
µ x d d,+( ) x=
π/2
xˆ1 xˆ2+( ) 2⁄ xN>
µi x d+ d,( ) µi x d′+ d′,( )< x 0> d d′>
µi 2x 0,( ) 2µi x 0,( )≥
µi x d+ d,( ) µi x d′+ d′,( )≤ x 0> d d′>
µi 2x 0,( ) 2µi x 0,( )>
ui x( ) x1 r–= 0 r 1< <
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Differentiating the right hand side with respect to , one obtains 
.
(The last inequality holds, for if we let  then ,  for 
 if .) Thus SF holds. Since , one has . 
Thus WR holds, but SR is violated. 
 Example 2.  Suppose that an individual is risk averse and the individual’s preferences can be 
represented by vN-M utility functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), i.e., 
, where . Then .
Thus WF and SR hold, while SF is not satisfied.
 Example 3. Suppose an individual’s preferences can be represented by vN-M utility func-
tions with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), i.e.,
with the parameter restrictions , , and . This is a broad class of utility func-
tions such that the CRRA ( ) and CARA (  and ) utility functions are limiting 
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cases. The restriction  ensure that agents are risk averse. We will show in the Appendix that 
both SF and SR hold for this class of utility functions. 
 Theorem 1.    Suppose that the buyer’s preferences satisfy [SF and WR] or [WF and SR]. 
Then forming an alliance is profitable, i.e. .
The theorem will be proved by the following two propositions: 
 Proposition 1.   Suppose that the buyer’s preferences satisfy [SF and WR] or [WF and SR]. 
Then a buyer representing an alliance receives a larger share of the benefit than an independent 
buyer in market two, i.e. .
Proof. If the buyer’s preferences satisfy SF and WR, one has
(10)
since . If the buyer’s preferences satisfy WF and SR instead, the weak and strict ine-
qualities in (10) are exchanged. Thus, in either case, one has, by (7), . If 
one compares this with (9), one can see that . Q.E.D.
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The proof of the above proposition shows how [SF and WR] or [WF and SR] work together 
to the buyer’s advantage. Depending on which pair of conditions is used, the role of one property 
is more conspicuous than the other. 
The fall-back wealth effect can be intuitively explained as follows: When bargaining with 
seller 2, the buyer’s breakdown payoff is what he receives from the bargaining with seller 1. Thus, 
if the bargaining with seller 2 breaks down, the buyer still receives some payoff from the earlier 
bargaining with seller 1. Due to SF (or WF), this lowers the buyer’s marginal risk concession and 
thus the buyer can credibly demand a larger share of the pie. 
The risk-sharing effect can be intuitively explained as follows: The two members of the alli-
ance share the spoils from bargaining. Due to SR (or WR), dividing a given payoff between two 
individuals leads to a lower marginal risk concession than giving the undivided payoff to one indi-
vidual. This increases the bargaining power of the alliance. 
It is interesting to note that when players with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form an 
alliance, there is positive fall-back wealth effect but zero risk-sharing, while when players with 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form an alliance, there is positive risk-sharing but zero 
fall-back wealth effect. 
We will now analyze the outcome of the bargaining between the buyer and seller 1. In this 
bargaining, both sides understand that if the buyer receives more in the current round, he will be 
able to extract more from his opponent in the next round. It is as if the buyer is subsidized on what 
he receives in the current round.25 This effect favors the buyer. The reason is that in order to 
24
increase the “perceived” pie, more should be given to the buyer. But, once the pie is increased in 
this way, the seller 1 may demand more from the increased pie. The overall effect is not clear a 
priori. Nevertheless, we establish
 Proposition 2.   Suppose that the buyer’s preferences satisfy [SF and WR] or [WF and SR]. 
Then a buyer representing an alliance receives a larger share of the benefit then an independent 
buyer in market one, i.e. . 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that . Then by Proposition 1, one has  and thus 
. (11)
From (8), (7), and (11), it follows that
i.e.,
.
Thus, one has
25.  See Chae (2002) for an analysis of tax incidence with bargaining.
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,
i.e., 
.
Thus, one has . Since  by (7), (9), and WR, one has , which leads to a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
We have derived our results in a sequential bargaining environment. Our modeling choice is 
motivated by the fact that real-world negotiations often seem to take place sequentially. The cen-
tral result that a buyers’ alliance yields buyer power, however, does not rely on this modeling 
choice. In an earlier working paper version (Chae and Heidhues 1999a), we modeled input-mar-
ket negotiations in such a way that each bargaining problem is resolved according to the Nash bar-
gaining solution taking it as given that all other bargaining problems are resolved.26 Under this 
alternative modeling choice, forming an alliance is profitable under the same set of conditions as 
the ones used to prove Theorem 1 in this paper. One advantage of the sequential approach adopted 
in this paper is that the equilibrium is unique. Thus the comparison of the outcomes for integrated 
bargaining and independent bargaining is made easy. 
26.  That in each bilateral negotiation players take the outcome of all other bargaining problems as given is a 
standard cooperative modelling approach for input-market negotiations (see, e.g. Chipty and Snyder 
(1999), Horn and Wolinsky (1988b), Dobson and Waterson (1997)). For a noncooperative foundation, see 
Bjoernerstedt and Stennek (2001).
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4. Welfare Consequences
So far, we have focused on how the downstream alliance structure affects buyer power. 
Within the model of the previous section, buyer power has only distributive consequences and has 
no efficiency consequences. In this section, we will touch on this issue by providing a simple 
incomplete contract example in which buyer power has efficiency consequences.27 
 Example 4. Consider two buyers whose preferences satisfy [SF and WR] or [WF and SR]. 
Either they have formed a buyers’ alliance or they are staying independent. Suppose they face two 
sellers who can exert effort in order to increase the likelihood of producing a high quality input. 
Assume that the sellers’ effort choices are noncontractable. A buyer’s vN-M utility function is 
denoted , while a seller’s vN-M utility function is , where  is the seller’s effort 
level. By exerting effort , a seller can produce a high quality input with probability . 
Denote the inverse function of  by , i.e., . 
For simplicity, we set the value of a low quality input to be zero and suppose that each buyer 
values the high quality input at a value . Furthermore, let , and 
. 
After the quality of the input is determined, the sellers negotiate with the buyers. A seller who 
produced a low quality input, receives a payoff of zero. In the case where only one seller produced 
a high quality input, the seller gets a share  if he faces an independent buyer and gets a share 
 if he faces a buyers’ alliance. Similarly, if both sellers have produced a high quality 
27. For different approaches on this issue, see Chae and Heidhues (1999b) and Inderst and Wey (2003).
U x( ) U x( ) e– e
e p f e( )=
f g e g p( )=
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g 1( ) U π( )>
π 2⁄
α π 2⁄≤
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input, each seller gets a share  when facing an independent buyer and gets a share  
otherwise. Thus a seller’s effort choice satisfies  when facing independent buy-
ers and satisfies
 
otherwise, where  is the other seller’s effort. Hence, a seller’s effort decreases when facing a 
buyers’alliance, which is socially undesirable in this example.
It should be noted in the above example that if the buyers rather than the sellers had to make 
a noncontractable effort choice, then a buyers’ alliance would increase social welfare. A general 
lesson from the above example is that the alliance structure affects bargaining power and thereby 
investment incentives and industry development. 
That the increase of buyer power can have efficiency consequences has been the topic of 
some of recent works, even though this literature does not deal with alliance. For instance, Chen 
(2003) develops a model to investigate Galbraith’s countervailing power hypothesis. In the first 
stage of his model, a single supplier sets a price for a competitive fringe of a given downstream 
market. He then negotiates a two-part tariff with a given large downstream buyer that has a pro-
duction cost advantage over the competitive fringe. Finally, the large downstream buyer set the 
product price in the final goods market (and the competitive fringe firms supply the good up to the 
point where marginal cost equals the market price). Chen models buyer power through an exoge-
nous bargaining power parameter that determines the share of the (second stage) surplus which 
the buyer can extract from the seller. His model shows that an increase in buyer power can 
π 2⁄ β π 2⁄<
g′ p( ) U π 2⁄( )=
g′ p( ) f e∗( )U β( ) 1 f e∗( )–{ }U α( ) U π 2⁄( )<+=
e∗
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increase total surplus because it gives an incentive for the seller to lower the retail price he sets for 
the competitive fringe and thereby leads to a lower product market price. He thus shows that the 
consequences of retail buyer power can indeed be advantageous for the consumer as envisioned 
by Galbraith - even though his mechanism differs. Chen’s model, however, does not explain the 
causes of buyer power as it is an exogenous parameter in his model.28 By providing a model in 
which the buyer power depends endogenously on the alliance structure, we provide a complemen-
tary insight that justifies the use of his model in addressing antitrust questions.
As another example, consider the paper by Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) on channel coordina-
tion. They investigate the relationship between a supplier and a retailer in an incomplete contract 
environment in which demand is uncertain, the retail price is unobservable by the supplier, and 
there is nonspecificability of the product. In their model, an initial contract is written, the retailer 
sets a price, demand is realized, and then the supplier and retailer renegotiate the terms at which 
the retailer buys the input to satisfy actual demand. Within this model, an inefficiency arises that 
is similar to the double markup problem. Hence, if the bargaining power of the buyer rises, the 
channel coordination (or the joint profits) increase. Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003), however, model 
the buyer power through an exogenous parameter and thus cannot predict how the organization of 
the downstream market affects the extend of channel coordination. This question, which is obvi-
ously important from an antitrust perspective, can be addressed if one uses the complementary 
insights that we have developed in the current paper.
28.In an extension of his basic model, Chen allows the downstream firm to choose the number of local mar-
kets it serves and assumes that the downstream firms’ buyer power increases in the number of local mar-
kets in which it is active. Our model provides condition under which the buyer power does increase 
endogenously and is thus complementary to his result. 
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a novel explanation as to why downstream mergers or buyers’ coop-
eratives can increase buyer power. Throughout, we focused on the case of downstream alliance 
that does not affect the product market outcome. While we view this mainly as a modeling device 
that allows us to abstract from well-known benefits of monopolization in a product market, we 
will now briefly discuss two industry examples in which abstracting from product market compe-
tition may be taken literally.
In the US cable industry, a downstream firm is typically a monopolist. A MSO can thus be 
naturally viewed as an alliance across independent local markets. Under this assumption, Chipty 
and Snyder (1999) tested whether their bargaining model - in which players negotiate over the 
incremental pie (taking it as given that all other negotiations are settled in equilibrium) - can 
explain mergers in the cable industry. Based on their model and data on supplier advertising reve-
nues, Chipty and Snyder maintain that, in the absence of any efficiency gains, mergers between 
cable operators would lower the effective pie over which downstream firms bargain. Hence a 
merger would lower the share that the downstream firms could receive.
Why then do cable company mergers occur? According to Chipty and Snyder, mergers must 
lead to (non-specified) efficiency gains. Upstream suppliers should gain from a downstream 
merger according to this efficiency gain explanation.29 In contrast, in our model, upstream pro-
29. This explanation, however, conflicts with our arm-chair observation that independent broadcasters 
actively lobby against relaxing national ownership restrictions on MSOs.
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gram suppliers should be hurt by the increase in cable operators’ buyer power. This suggests a 
simple empirical test to differentiate between these two theories.
In the European agricultural sector, the EU determines prices for and/or quantities of numer-
ous agricultural products. In this system, a buyers’ cooperative in the input market cannot affect 
the product market. Thus an input supplier can be viewed as bargaining with a given farmer or 
farmers’ cooperative over the fixed quasi-rent generated by his input. This may make the sector 
especially appealing for future empirical work aimed at testing between our and other buyer 
power theories that abstract from product market competition.
In an empirical study on wholesale pharmaceuticals, Ellison and Snyder (2001) finds that 
“Price discounts depend more on the ability to substitute among alternative suppliers than on 
sheer buyer size. In particular, hospitals and HMOs, which can use restrictive formulae to enhance 
their substitution opportunities beyond those available for drugstores, obtain substantially lower 
prices. Chain drugstores only receive a small size discount relative to independents, at most two 
percent on average, and then only for products for which drugstores have some substitution 
opportunities (i.e., not for on-patent branded drugs).” Even though Ellison and Snyder interpret 
their result as an evidence favoring “collusion models” of countervailing power over existing bar-
gaining models, this conclusion should be interpreted carefully, for bargaining power of merged 
buyers would depend on the nature of competition on the seller side even in bargaining models. 
Given their result, however, it remains a theoretical challenge to determine qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively how the structure of competition on both sides of the market affects the bargaining 
advantage of an alliance. 
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Another issue our paper dealt with is the welfare consequences of the increased buyer power 
through alliance. We provided a simple example where alliances, which change buyer power, 
have an effect on investment incentives and industry development. In this example, there is an ini-
tial investment decision with contractual incompleteness and the investing firm faces a hold-up 
problem as the benefits from investment will partially be shared with their bargaining partners. 
There has been a growing concern on the causes and consequences of buyer power among 
antitrust authorities and we submit that our paper helps to clarify these important issues. A full 
understanding of these issues, however, requires more future research efforts. 
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 Appendix
Proof of Equation (7). From equations (4) and (5), one has 
.
Thus, using (2) and (3), one obtains
,
i.e.,
.
Thus
.
By L’Hopital’s rule, 
,
from which (7) follows. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Equation (8). In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the equilibrium payoff 
vector  can be obtained as follows: 
Let  be the equilibrium payoff vector when the buyer is the initial proposer, and let 
 the equilibrium payoff vector when the seller is the initial proposer. If the breakdown 
probability is , then
,
.
That is, 
, (12)
. (13)
The solution can be obtained by combining these with the feasibility conditions 
, (14)
. (15)
Since  and  are independent, we will first take the limit as  approaches 1. Thus replace 
 and  by  and , respectively, in (12). 
, (16)
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Let . Then the function  is increasing due to the assumption that 
 is convex, and one has . Since  from 
(14) and (15), one has 
.
i.e.,
.
Thus 
,
By L’Hopital’s rule, 
.
from which (8) follows. Q.E.D.
 Proof that HARA Preferences satisfy SF and WR. First, we establish that  for 
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and thus
First, consider the case where . In this case, we have  if and only if 
This is equivalent to 
Note that for  the left hand side is equal to the right hand side. Furthermore,
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, 
while
.
Thus we have , which establishes that  for . Similarly, one 
can show that SF is satisfied for the cases where  and .
Next, we establish that . From above, one has
Hence,
and thus
Hence, SR is satisfied. Q.E.D.
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